Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Vermont Law School’s Sports and Entertainment Law Society to host two panels at annual Solutions Conference

vls solutions banner

Vermont Law School will host its annual Solutions Conference on April 3rd and 4th. The Vermont Law School Sports and Entertainment Law Society along with the National Sports and Entertainment Law Society will host two panels:

  • Alternative Legal Careers: Sports and the Law

Date & Time: Friday, April 3rd, 2009 from 10:30-12pm
Panelist:Ed Mattes, Jim Munsey, Andrew Weber, and Michael Zarren
Moderator: Michael McCann

  • Keynote Address: Topic TBA

Date & Time: Friday, April 3rd, 2009 from 5:30-7:30pm
Speaker: Reggie Hudlin

The Solutions Conference is FREE to Vermont Law School Faculty, Staff and Students. The Solutions Conference is also open to the surrounding community for $25 per person. Everyone interested in attending must register for the Solutions Conference here.

Monday, March 30, 2009

NBA Age Limit Discussion at New York Law School

Last week I joined Alan Milstein, Marc Edelman, Paul Haberman and others on a sports law panel at New York Law School. Zach Lowe of the American Lawyer was there to cover it. Here's an excerpt from his piece, which highlighted discussion of the NBA's age limit:

* * *

NBA officials have hinted they want to raise the age limit to 20 when the current collective bargaining agreement expires in 2011. Luckily for us, the age limit topic dominated the discussion during a panel talk Wednesday at New York Law School featuring several high-profile sports lawyers. Even better, we heard Alan Milstein, a litigator at Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky promise that he plans to mount a legal challenge against the NBA's age-limit ban, which, to put it politely, he does not like. (Milstein called the ban "outrageous," "hypocritical," and "a sham." He and other panelists who share his views--including Michael McCann of Vermont Law School and Sports Law Blog fame--wonder why hoops players have to wait while tennis players and soccer players can turn pro as youngish teens).

Milstein says he's just waiting for a player willing to challenge the rule, and he thinks he can win on antitrust grounds (among others). It wouldn't be Milstein's first attempt at taking on such an age limit. With help from McCann, he fought the National Football League's age limit on behalf of former Ohio State University star running back Maurice Clarett. Clarett, who lost that case, is now serving a 7-1/2 year prison sentence after being convicted on various criminal charges, including robbery. Milstein speculates that Clarett may have stayed out of trouble had he been allowed to enter the NFL early and earn a living.

The Clarett experience won't stop Milstein from going after the NBA's age limit. "I'm hoping to find a player to challenge it in the next couple of years," he told the panel.

* * *

For the rest of the piece, click here.

New York Times article on those unbelieving Swedes and Danes

Phil Zuckerman spent 14 months in Scandinavia, talking to hundreds of Danes and Swedes about religion. It wasn’t easy.

Anyone who has paid attention knows that Denmark and Sweden are among the least religious nations in the world. Polls asking about belief in God, the importance of religion in people’s lives, belief in life after death or church attendance consistently bear this out.

It is also well known that in various rankings of nations by life expectancy, child welfare, literacy, schooling, economic equality, standard of living and competitiveness, Denmark and Sweden stand in the first tier.

Well documented though they may be, these two sets of facts run up against the assumption of many Americans that a society where religion is minimal would be, in Mr. Zuckerman’s words, “rampant with immorality, full of evil and teeming with depravity.”


Article continues...


thanks to M Male.

Salary cap for soccer teams in Europe?

Nowadays the financial crisis also seems to be hitting the European sports sector. Sport clubs, associations and politicians come up with different proposals to solve the crisis or at least prevent clubs to fall into bankruptcy. One of the topics in the world of European soccer is the introduction of a salary cap which should improve the financial situation of the clubs. The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) is currently (re-)considering the idea of limiting clubs' expenditure on salary and transfer fees to a particular proportion of their direct and indirect sporting revenues.


Revenue would be defined as money received only from ticket sales, sponsorship, merchandise and television income. It would not include any financial investment by owners or major shareholders. Apart from creating tools to battle the financial crisis, the introduction of a salary cap tries to limit the increasing importance of (mostly) foreign investors which seem to destabilize competition. According to UEFA these foreign investors are responsible for immoral wages and transfer fees.

The UEFA is of the opinion that the United States sports system and regulators could be an example of how to maintain a competitive balance between sporting measures and regulations to ensure the clubs are properly managed. The main arguments of the critics however are the following:

- The introduction of a salary cap must be introduced at international level. If one or more national leagues refuse to introduce the salary cap, this could result into a competitive gap between capped and uncapped leagues.

- The richest (and most powerful) clubs in Europe will resist on the introduction of the salary cap as it could undermine their competitive advantage.

- There is no such thing as a European accounting, financial or auditing standard which could safeguard that the salary cap will equally applied in the different countries. The introduction of a salary cap would need to be accompanied by the introduction of (strict) financial/accountancy rules for all clubs.

There is no doubt that measures need to be taken to improve the financial situation of the European soccer teams. The financial crisis could be the ideal stimulus for the European authorities to come up with initiatives to introduce a global framework with coherent financial, auditing and accounting standards which the different teams have to respect. A salary cap could be one of those standards, but will have little effect without a global framework.

Saturday, March 28, 2009

Why the Florida Marlins now are state actors in their new stadium

The gory details of the stadium deal that my esteemed city, county, and state officials recently struck illustrate how my state-action arguments can work as to fan speech in publicly funded stadiums.

If there is anything left to the "symbiotic relationship" test of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority (admittedly a debatable proposition for a Civil-Rights-Era-product-of-its-time decision), this deal satisfies it. The government is paying 75 % of the costs to build a cathedral for the long-term predominant use and exclusive benefit of one private entity, in exchange for limited immediate financial benefit, hoped-for "psychic" benefits of keeping the team in town, and potential (but never-fully-realized) downstream economic benefits of a neighborhood and area revival. This is the essence of the exchange of mutual benefits and mutually beneficial relationship that Burton said triggered state action when the private beneficiary restricted constitutional rights in the course of managing that public space.

Think of it this way: The Marlins bear no serious financial burden in this deal. Why not make them bear the burden of having to respect the First Amendment liberties of the fans who are funding this boondoggle.

Plantinga Paper

My copy of Naturalism Defeated - essays on Plantinga's argument against evolutionary naturalism, finally got here. The paper by William Ramsey does make the same point as me in the paper I am writing, though in a much sketchier way. Interestingly, Plantinga responds at the end. So I'll redo the paper in light of this....

Scruton: The Return of Religion

Stevec sent a link to this piece by Roger Scruton. The Return of Religion.

His main point is, I think, that the new atheists just assume science can answer every question.

I don't think they do, but even if they did, they don't need to in order to be able to blow Scruton's God out of the water. See here...

As a rule, I always stress that I do NOT say science can answer every question. That's a hostage to fortune.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

UConn Accused of Recruiting Violations for Nate Miles

Paul Doyle of the Hartford Courant interviewed me for a story concerning former UConn recruit Nate Miles and possible NCAA violations committed by the university, especially by former student-manager0turned agent Josh Nichomson (who himself may soon be sued for defrauding clients, including Richard Hamilton of the Pistons). Miles would never play UConn, as he was expelled due to Miles violating a restraing order.

Below is an excerpt of Doyle's story.

* * *
The UConn men's basketball team is playing in a Sweet 16 game tonight in the NCAA Tournament, but on Wednesday things took on a decidedly sour tone off the court.

Coach Jim Calhoun was answering questions about a Yahoo! Sports report that said his program broke NCAA rules in recruiting Nate Miles. The story, posted early Wednesday, reported that former UConn team manager Josh Nochimson represented Miles as an agent and that former UConn assistant coach Tom Moore was aware of the relationship.

The story also cited phone records attained through the Freedom of Information Act that showed that five UConn coaches called Nochimson and sent him text messages at least 1,565 times during a nearly two-year period before and after Miles' recruitment in 2006 and early 2007. Calhoun had 16 of those communications, Yahoo! reported.

Miles, a 6-foot-7 guard from Toledo, Ohio, was expelled by UConn on Oct. 2 amid allegations that he had abused a female student. A restraining order was issued on Sept. 22, and Miles was arrested for calling the woman 16 minutes later. He never played a game for UConn and has since enrolled at Southern Idaho, a junior college.

The university would not say whether it has started an internal investigation, but it did say in a statement that it "takes very seriously its responsibilities of NCAA membership and will do all that is expected to follow up on any information related to possible NCAA rules violations."

UConn also would not say if it was in contact with the NCAA or whether a system exists to monitor coaches' calls to recruits. That could be an issue with the NCAA, which says that a school must demonstrate "institutional control." The NCAA also says that it expects the head coach of a program to promote an atmosphere of compliance.

At a press conference in Glendale, Ariz., Calhoun refused to respond Wednesday to the specific allegations. "[UConn] tries to live under the responsibility of the NCAA rules," Calhoun said. "The student-athlete departed UConn. And the reason I mention this prior to any competition because there is no problem now with games or what happened during those particular games, nor should there be. At least I don't think so."

Stacey Osburn, a spokeswoman for the NCAA infractions committee, said that the NCAA would not address the allegations. "We can't comment on current, pending or potential investigations," Osburn said.

Joe Linta, a sports agent from Branford, assessed the situation this way: "If it's a phone call violation, I think it will only be a slap on the wrist. If there is an infiltration with an agent who was involved in the program and is doing illegal things, then it becomes very serious."

Vermont Law School Professor Michael McCann, who specializes in sports law and writes a column for SI.com, said that the NCAA could come down hard on UConn. The NCAA could impose recruiting restrictions or take away scholarships, but it was unlikely to force UConn to forfeit games because Miles did not play.

"I think it's potentially major, certainly if Calhoun was involved or had knowledge of what was going on," McCann said. "UConn could argue that what Nochimson did was so outside the boundaries of his work with UConn or his association with UConn that he really was not acting on behalf of UConn. But I think it's a hard argument to make because his actions, if they're true, benefited UConn. I think the real question is, how high up the chain did these transgressions go?"

* * *
To read the rest of the story, click here. To read the Yahoo! story, click here. For a report on the NCAA contacting UConn about this, check out Seth Davis' piece on SI.com.

Marlins New Stadium Deal = Worst in Taxpayer History?

On several occasions, I have written about how professional sports teams use monopoly power to demand stadium subsidies from their local governments.

Yesterday, at Above the Law, I argued that the new stadium agreement just signed between Miami-Dade County and Florida Marlins owner Jeffrey Loria will prove to be the worst ever for taxpayers.
I believe this for three reasons:

1. The specific terms of the Marlins stadium agreement skew hugely in the team's favor. Although Marlins owner Jeffrey Loria is funding only about 25% of the new stadium's costs, he will get to keep 100% of stadium revenues -- including non-baseball related revenues, concert revenues, and revenues from the sale of stadium naming rights. The county, which is paying $359 million in up-front funding, meanwhile keeps nothing.

2. Marlins ownership has never been willing to invest money into their club. Last year, the Marlins team payroll was just $22 million, which is $58 million below the league median, and by far the lowest in the league. Rather than investing in their own team, Marlins President David Samson often used the threat of keeping a low payroll as part of his strategy in demanding public subsidies.

3. This is America's first stadium deal since our economy collapsed. It cannot be overlooked that in the past year the average taxpayer has lost close to half of his retirement funds, and that, with unemployment skyrocketing, local municipalities will collect less tax money in 2008 and 2009 than in the past. This all makes this public funding to one of the county's already wealthiest citizens all the more repulsive.

For those interested in reading my full column at Above the Law, please see here. Also, my most recent law review article on publicly funded sports stadiums is attached here.

Indian Cricket League Moves Tournament to South Africa


On Tuesday, I was interviewed for the BBC World Radio Service program World Have Your Say, for the story, Is India Showing Weakness in the Face of Terrorism?. After an attack on Sri Lanka's cricket team in Pakistan earlier this month, India's government informed the year-old Indian Premier League that the government would be unable to provide security for its spring tournament due to competing security obligations in connection with upcoming national elections. Siddhartha Vaidyanathan of Forbes has good coverage of the controversy here.

Although the decision has disappointed Indian fans, it has had some interesting financial consequences. The IPL renegotiated its broadcast deal in light of the move, obtaining nearly $500 million more than it was to receive had the event been held in India as originally planned.

We've written previously about terrorism and security in connection with sports: Mike's posts FBI: Terrorism Threat Against NFL is a Hoax and Sports and Stadium Security, Five Years Later, Howard's post Fan Consent and the Constitution at the Ballpark, my post
Federal Court Continues to Bar Suspicionless Stadium Patdowns , and Greg's post Pat Downs at Sports Arenas: Necessary Precaution or Unconstitutional Search?

An Unconstitutional Tax for Traitorous Ballplayers?

Via TaxProf blog, a New York lawyer has (humorously) proposed an AIG-bonus-type tax for Manny Ramirez: The Manny Ramirez Lightbulb: Also (2 Ideas in 1 Memo) Putting Pay in Perspective.

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

SCIENCE AND RELIGION: Simon Singh, Mary Warnock, Jack Cohen, Stephen Law



PLEASE PUBLICIZE!

Saturday 25th April 2009

A day exploring the relationship between science and religion, with some very eminent and well-known speakers (plus myself).

The day will address, among other issues, such questions as: Are religion and science non-overlapping magesteria? Can science support, or undermine, religious beliefs? If so, how? If not, why not?

This promises to be a fascinating series of talks, whatever your views on religion.

Simon Singh will talk about Georges Lamaitre (scientist and priest) and the Big Bang, Baroness Mary Warnock about "religion as humanism" Jack Cohen about evolution and belly buttons, and Stephen Law about empirical evidence against the God hypothesis.

The cost is £10 (£5 students and national Humanist orgs). BOOK NOW. Send a cheque payable to “Centre for Inquiry London” to: Executive Director Suresh Lalvani, Centre for Inquiry London, at the Conway Hall address (include names of all those coming). Alternatively pay by PAYPAL (credit and debit cards). Use the “Support CFI London” link at www.cfilondon.org and follow the instructions.

Presented by CFI UK and the Ethical Society.

10.30-11.00am registration. Talks are 11.00am-1.00pm and 2.00-4.00pm

VENUE: Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square. London WC1R 4RL (nr. Holborn tube)

JOIN OUR FACEBOOK PAGE FOR UPDATES.

Monday, March 23, 2009

New Sports Law Scholarship






Recently published scholarship includes:
Roger I. Abrams & Alan Levy, The trial of Rube Waddell, 19 SETON HALL JOURNAL OF SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 1 (2009)

James Bamberg, Wrestling with a union: can anyone protect the 6’7”, 300-pound professional wrestler from the sports-entertainment industry?, 2 FLORIDA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW 1 (2008)

Susannah Carr, Title IX: an opportunity to level the Olympic playing field, 19 SETON HALL JOURNAL OF SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 149 (2009)

Anita L. DeFrantz, Which rules?: international sport and doping in the 21st century, 31 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2008)

Ian Dobinson and David Thorpe, What’s wrong with the Commissioner? Some lessons from Downunder, 19 SETON HALL JOURNAL OF SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 105 (2009)

Will Hendrick, Comment, Pay or play?: on specific performance and sports franchise leases, 87 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 504 (2009)

Andrew Lothson, A university’s implied contractual obligation to protect a student-athlete’s educational opportunity in relation to non-traditional games: a breach of contract?, 2 FLORIDA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW 113 (2008)

Wes R. McCart, Note, Title IX crashes the party in college athletic recruiting, 58 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 153 (2008)

Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete eligibility requirements and legal protection of sports participation opportunities, 8 VIRGINIA SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 71 (2008)

Jeffrey W. Moore, How sports can benefit communities burdened by brownfields, 8 VIRGINIA SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 1 (2008)

Michael J. Nichols, Note, Time for a Hail Mary: With bleak prospects of being aided by a college version of the NFL’s Rooney Rule, should minority college football coaches turn their attention to Title VII litigation?, 8 VIRGINIA SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 147-172 (2008)

Jordan Michael Rossen, Note, The NBA’s age minimum and its effect on high school phenoms, 8 VIRGINIA SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 173 (2008)

George T. Stiefel III, Comment, Hard Ball, Soft Law in MLB: Who Died and Made WADA the Boss?, 56 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW 1225 (2008)

The Phases and Faces of the Duke Lacrosse Controversy: A Conversation (Howard M. Wasserman, moderator; James E. Coleman, Jr., Angela Davis, Michael Gerhardt, K. C. Johnson and Lyrissa Lidsky, panelists), 19 SETON HALL JOURNAL OF SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 181 (2009)

Jonathan Yovel, Legal formalism, institutional norms, and the morality of basketball, 8 VIRGINIA SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 33 (2008)

New Draft Plantinga Paper

A work in progress - posted for comments - NOT TO BE COPIED OR REPRODUCED ELSEWHERE!

3rd draft


Plantinga’s Belief-Cum-Desire Argument Refuted


In the final chapter of Warrant and Proper Function , Plantinga argues that, if both:

(N) naturalism – the view that there are no supernatural beings

(E) evolution - current evolutionary doctrine

are true, then the probability that:

(R) our cognitive faculties are reliable and produce mostly true beliefs

must be either low or inscrutable.
Plantinga argues, further, that this argument furnishes anyone who accepts N&E with a undefeatable defeater for any belief produced by those faculties, including N&E itself. Hence, N&E has been shown to be self-defeating.
One part of this larger argument is what I call Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument. The belief-cum-desire argument is designed to show something more specific - that if the content of our beliefs does causally affect behaviour, and N&E, then the probability of R cannot be high.
Critics of Plantinga’s larger argument against N&E have usually tended to concede, whether or not for the sake of argument, that the conclusion of the belief-cum-desire argument is true, and have instead rejected Plantinga’s suggestion that his larger conclusion that N&E is self-defeating does not follow (or, if it does, much the same problem plagues theism). My aim here is different – I aim simply to refute the belief-cum-desire argument.

Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument
Suppose some hypothetical rational creatures a lot like us evolve on a planet a lot like Earth - they “hold beliefs, change beliefs, make inferences, and so on” . Suppose:

(C) causal efficacy – the content of beliefs causally affects behaviour

is true. What is the probability of R/N&E&C specified with respect to these creatures – what is the probability that their cognitive faculties are reliable?
The probability, says Plantinga, is not as high as you might initially be tempted to suppose. For it is not belief per se that is adaptive, but the behaviour it produces. And behaviour is caused by both belief and desire. But then, claims Plantinga, for any given adaptive action (action that enhances the creatures ability to survive and reproduce),

there will be many belief-desire combinations that could produce that action; and very many of those belief-desire combinations will be such that the belief involved is false.

Plantinga illustrates like so:

So suppose Paul is a prehistoric hominid; a hungry tiger approaches. Fleeing is perhaps the most appropriate behavior: I pointed out that this behavior could be produced by a large number of different belief-desire pairs. To quote myself: “Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief. . . . . Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it. . . . or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a regularly recurring illusion, and, hoping to keep his weight down, has formed the resolution to run a mile at top speed whenever presented with such an illusion; or perhaps he thinks he is about to take part in a 1600 meter race, wants to win, and believes the appearance of the tiger is the starting signal; or perhaps . . . . Clearly there are any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior.”

So adaptive behaviour can be produced by many belief-desire combinations and, “in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false” . We cannot, concludes Plantinga, estimate the probability of R on N&E&C as high. And of course, if we cannot estimate that probability as high for these hypothetical creatures, then we cannot estimate it as high in our own case either.
The above argument that the probability of R given N&E&C cannot be high has some superficial plausibility. Plantinga is surely correct that:

(i) it is behaviour that evolution selects for rather than beliefs per se.

He is also correct that:

(ii) for any piece of adaptive behaviour, there are many belief-desire combinations that might produce it, on many of which the belief or beliefs in question are false.

However, I will show that, appearances to the contrary, it does not follow from (i) and (ii) that we cannot reasonably estimate the probability of R on N&E&C as being high. Indeed, I shall go further, and sketch out some reasons for supposing that the probability of R given N&E&C must, in fact, be fairly high.

Refutation of Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument

Consider two possible scenarios:

(a) we have evolved certain false beliefs and certain desires that, in combination, result in adaptive behaviour
(b) we evolved certain unreliable belief-producing mechanisms and certain desires that, in combination, result in adaptive behaviour.

Perhaps, on N&E&C, (a) is not so unlikely, for the reasons Plantinga cites. Suppose I have an innate belief that tigers are cuddly and that best way to pet a tiger is to run away from it. If I am also equipped with an innate desire to pet tigers, this results in adaptive behaviour.
But what about (b)? How likely is it on N&E&C that our belief-producing mechanisms are unreliable? Consider the question: what particular set of desires would a species need to evolve in order for the beliefs generated by such an unreliable mechanism to result in generally adaptive behaviour? We will look at some examples, beginning with the cognitive faculty of reason.

Example one: fallacy of affirming the consequent

Consider the fallacy of affirming the consequent (FAC). The FAC is an unreliable form of inference. It sometimes produces true conclusions, but often false.
Suppose evolution hard-wires a species of hominid H to be highly prone to the FAC. Suppose a member of this species, H1, concludes using the FAC that jumping out of planes is not safe. Another member of the same species, H2, concludes using the FAC that jumping off tall buildings is safe. They might reason like so:

H1’s inference:
If jumping out of planes is not safe, jumping out of balloons is not safe
Jumping out of balloons is not safe
Jumping out of planes is not safe

H2’s inference:
If jumping out of planes is safe, then jumping out of planes wearing a parachute is safe
Jumping out of planes wearing a parachute is safe
Jumping out of planes is safe

If evolution hard-wires a desire into species H to make H2’s resulting belief that jumping out of planes is safe adaptive – e.g. a powerful desire to commit suicide - that same hard-wired desire will result in the likely death of H1.
What set of desires must evolution instil in species H to render adaptive the potentially-mal-adaptive consequences of applying the FAC? There is none. But then evolution cannot render this unreliable form of inference adaptive by instilling a particular set of desires in H.
The FAC sometimes produces false beliefs, but sometimes true. Is that the reason why evolution cannot render the FAC adaptive? Could a method of inference that consistently produced false conclusions from true premises be made adaptive by pairing it with an appropriate set of desires? No, as I explain below.

Example two: Counter-induction

Suppose that two hominids appear: hominid A and hominid B. A reasons inductively, B counter-inductively, like so:

A observes that whenever other hominids eat, they usually continue to live, and when they stop eating, they die. He concludes that if he eats, he’ll probably continue to live, and if he stops eating, he’ll die.

B observes that whenever other hominids eat, they usually continue to live, and when they stop eating, they die. He concludes that if he eats, he’ll probably die, and if he stops eating, he’ll continue to live.

When A applies his form of reasoning to true premises, he is likely to end up with a true belief. B on the other hand, is likely to end up with a false belief. His counter-inductive method of reasoning consistently produces false beliefs.
However, if evolution equips A with a desires to live, and B with a desires to die, B’s false belief is just as adaptive as A’s true belief. So while counter-induction has delivered a false belief, it has not delivered behaviour that is mal-adaptive. In fact, it has delivered behaviour just as adaptive as that delivered by induction.
So far, it seems that Plantinga is correct: given evolution equips A and B with the right desires, the behaviour produced by the two belief-forming mechanisms is equally adaptive.
But now suppose A and B engage in further reasoning, applying their respective methods of inference like so:

A observes that other hominids that forage and hunt get food to eat, and those who don’t get none. A concludes that if he hunts and gathers, he’ll get food to eat, and if he doesn’t he’ll get none.

B observes that other hominids that forage and hunt get food to eat, and those that don’t get none. B concludes that if he doesn’t hunts and gather, he’ll get food to eat, and if he does, he’ll get none.

Now, A’s reasoning helps him survive. Given his desire to live, these two inferences together will lead him to hunt and gather. That’s adaptive behaviour.
The problem is, given the desire required to get B’s first counter-inductive inference to produce adaptive behaviour, B’s second counter-inductive inference is now likely to produce mal-adaptive behaviour. Given B’s desire to die, plus his false belief that eating will kill him, his second counter-inductively generated conclusion will no doubt lead him not to go hunting and gathering. That’s not adaptive behaviour. B will probably starve to death.

Plantinga is correct that for any piece of adaptive behaviour, there are many belief-desire combinations that might produce it, on many of which the belief or beliefs in question are false. But it does not follow that the probability of R given N&E&C cannot reasonably be estimated as high. The members of a species equipped with unreliable belief-forming mechanisms such as the FAC or counter-induction will end up with all sorts of combinations of false beliefs the mal-adaptive consequences of which cannot be neutralized by evolution hard-wiring that species with some particular set of desires.
In fact there are two difficulties here.
First, there is the problem of novel beliefs. An advantage of procedural reasoning is that it allows for creatures able to problem solve and adapt, within their own lifetimes, to a changing environment and novel situations. An adaptive inferential mechanism is likely to applied in new ways. But then evolution cannot then anticipate what desires will be required to render adaptive the innumerable potentially mal-adaptive conclusions likely to be drawn. If B draws the first counter-inductive conclusion, his desire to die renders his conclusion adaptive. But if B happens to go on to draw that second conclusion using the same unreliable form of inference, that very same desire now renders the conclusion mal-adaptive.
The second problem is – not only can evolution not anticipate which desires creatures will need to render the conclusions of an unreliable mechanism adaptive – when it comes to unreliable forms of inference, there just is no set of desires that will render the mechanism adaptive. A set of desires that renders one set of conclusions adaptive will render another set of conclusions generated by the same mechanism mal-adaptive.
On the other hand, evolution can make reliable forms of inference adaptive in a straightforward way, by equipping the species in question with desires for those things that enhance its ability to survive and reproduce. In which case, the probability that reliable forms of inference will evolve, as opposed to an unreliable forms of inference, looks to be high.

Other cognitive faculties

The considerations sketched out above suggest that N&E&C should lead us to estimate the probability that our cognitive faculty of procedural reasoning is reliable as fairly high. But of course, procedural reason alone furnishes us with little, if any, knowledge. Other cognitive faculties – mostly notable perception and memory – must also come into play.
How reasonable is it, given N&E&C, to suppose that these other faculties are reliable? If there is no good reason to suppose they are reliable, then there’s no good reason to suppose our various faculties working in conjunction constitute a reliable belief-forming system. My car may have a reliable carburettor, but if other parts are unreliable, the car as a whole remains unreliable.
So let’s now look at the cognitive faculties of memory and perception. Has Plantinga shown that, given N&E&C, the probability that these other faculties are reliable connot be high?

Memory
Suppose hominid species H is equipped with an unreliable memory. Hominid H1 has at time t1 true beliefs A and B. But, because H1’s memory is unreliable, she later believes the falsehoods not-A and not-B. Is there a desire or set of desires with which evolution might also equip species H that will render adaptive the behaviour produced by these two resulting false beliefs? Very probably. If A is the belief that if you eat you will live and B the belief that if you don’t eat you will die, these beliefs will result in adaptive action if H1 desires to die. However, because H1 previously believed A and B, she would previously have not eaten, which is mal-adaptive behaviour. There is no set of desires that will make both the input and output beliefs of this unreliable faculty result in adaptive behaviour. But then unguided evolution cannot equip species H with a set of desires that will make the input and output beliefs of this unreliable memory faculty generally adaptive. Evolution can, on the other hand, equip a species with a set of desires that will make the input and output beliefs of a reliable faculty generally adaptive. It appears, then, that N&E&C will therefore strongly favour a reliable memory faculty over an unreliable faculty.

Perception
How likely is it, on N&E&C, that evolution would produce a species with a reliable perceptual-mechanism-cum-desire combination, rather than an unreliable-perceptual-mechanism-cum-desire combination?
Fairly likely, I suspect. There are two categories of unreliable perceptual mechanisms:

(1) Unreliable mechanisms producing mostly false beliefs.
(2) Unreliable mechanisms that produce significant proportion of, but not mostly, false beliefs

Let’s begin by considering perceptual or quasi-perceptual mechanisms of type (1). Such mechanisms fall, in turn, into two categories:

(1a) Unreliable mechanisms producing mostly false beliefs but in a systematic, predictable way.

and

(1b) Unreliable mechanisms producing mostly false beliefs in a random, unpredictable way

An example of (1a) would be a perceptual or quasi-perceptual mechanism that, whenever the subject is presented with a tiger, produces the belief there is a rabbit present. There is consistency to the error. An example of (1b) would be a perceptual or quasi-perceptual mechanism that, when the subject is presented with a tiger, may the first time produce the belief there is nothing present, the next time the belief a rabbit present, the next time the belief there is a chair present, and the time after that the belief there’s a side of beef present, etc., but rarely if ever the belief that there is a tiger present. While we can predict that the subject will make an error about there being a tiger in front of them, it is not possible, even given knowledge of the erroneous beliefs previously produced when a tiger was present, to predict what erroneous belief will now be produced on this occasion.
Can unguided evolution make an unreliable mechanism of type (1b) produce adaptive behaviour by combining it with an appropriate set of desires? It is hard to see how. If there is a tiger present and the mechanism makes me believe there is a rabbit present, my mistaken belief can still result in adaptive behaviour if evolution has given me a desire to run away from rabbits. But if the erroneous beliefs are being generated in a random way, there will be no particular desire or set of desires with which evolution might equip me that will make the random false beliefs generated by this mechanism adaptive.
What about a mechanism of type (1a)? Does the pattern to the errors produced by the mechanism mean that evolution can render the mechanism adaptive by combining it with an appropriate set of desires?
That suggestion might seem plausible when we consider a very simple example of adaptive behaviour, such as running away from tigers. If the mechanism systematically produces the belief that a rabbit is present whenever a tiger is present, all evolution need do is instil in these subjects a powerful desire to run away from rabbits.
But the suggestion becomes far less plausible when we consider more we consider sophisticated patterns of adaptive behaviour.
Suppose, for example, that to reach food you need to survive, you need to engage in some team activity with other members of your species – e.g. negotiating some tricky terrain that includes a narrow ledge and a poisonous snake. Someone has to distract the snake while someone else crawls carefully along the edge and leaps over the snake at the exact moment it is distracted.
Now try to imagine a perceptual mechanism of type (1a) that produces false mostly beliefs about your surroundings, but beliefs that, when paired with certain desires with which evolution has pre-equipped your species, will result in the required adaptive behaviour from you and your team mates.
You must not believe there is a snake and a ledge and some food and some team mates with whom you must co-operate. And nor must your team mates. You, and they, must have mostly false beliefs about your environment, but beliefs that, nevertheless, when paired with desires with which evolution has collectively furnished you, lead you to act in tandem with your other team members to retrieve and eat the food.
In fact, setting aside the challenge of imagining such a mechanism, it is a difficult enough challenge to construct just a set of mostly false beliefs and hard-wired desires that would result in the complex sequence of actions required. Perhaps it is not impossible. Perhaps your (1a) type mechanism causes you to believe that instead of food at the end of the ledge, there’s a little man who will give you a tickle stick if you walk carefully along a white line, jumping in the air after 15 seconds, and then reach down and take the stick. Perhaps you believe that eating the tickle stick is the best way to get tickled. If we pair this false belief with a desire to be tickled, your resulting sequence of actions might yet be adaptive. You might successfully negotiate the narrow ledge, leap over that snake (though who is going to distract it?) and then eat the food.
However, even if we can come up with a mostly-false-perceptual-belief-cum-desire combination that would, in this situation, result in adaptive action, it is still more difficult still to come up with a belief-forming mechanism of type (1a), which, paired with an appropriate set of desires, will result in sophisticated patterns of adaptive behaviour generally of the sort of which we are capable. If the next time the food lies beyond a precipice that can only be negotiated if you and your team place a tree trunk across the gap, then the false belief “There’s a little man who will give you a tickle stick if you walk carefully forward along the white line, jumping in the air after 15 seconds…” combined with that powerful desire to be tickled will send you and your team mates straight over the cliff. That is not adaptive behaviour.
It is not yet clear that there is any set of desires that, when combined with an unreliable perceptual mechanism of type (1a), will generally produce sophisticated patterns of adaptive behaviour of the kind we actually exhibit.

Let’s now turn to perceptual mechanisms of the second sort:

(2) Unreliable mechanisms that produce a significant proportion of, but not mostly, false beliefs

Such, as it were, hit and miss (as opposed to consistently miss) mechanisms may also be of two kinds: those that producing false beliefs in a random way – there being no pattern to the errors, and those in which the errors are, in certain respects, systematic.
We have already seen in the case of mechanisms of type (1b) that a mechanism producing erroneous beliefs in a random way is not a mechanism that evolution might pair off with a particular set of desires such that adaptive behaviour will result.
But what of a hit and miss mechanism in which there is a pattern to the misses? An example would be a mechanism that was reliable with respect to the shape of objects but systematically unreliable with respect to position. Equipped with such a mechanism, a creature might believe, correctly, that there is a square object in its vicinity, but it will be mistaken about where that object is located. Could evolution pair off such an unreliable mechanism with a set of desires that will make the false beliefs produced result in generally adaptive behaviour?
Are there potentially many such perceptual or quasi-perceptual mechanisms that while systematically producing many false beliefs, will still result in generally adaptive behaviour given evolution pairs the mechanism with an appropriate set of desires? And, if so, is there a significant probability, on N&E&C, that we have evolved such an unreliable mechanism, rather than a reliable mechanism?
Here is a sketch of two reasons why we may not be able to answer yes to both these questions.
First, we have seen that it is difficult to envisage type (1a) mechanisms that, given N&E, will result not just generally adaptive bits of behaviour, but sophisticated sequences of team activity of the sort required to retrieve the food from that snake-inhabited narrow ledge. I cannot see that it is significantly easier to envisage a type (2) mechanisms of that sort. Try, for example, to envisage a type (2) mechanism producing mostly correct beliefs about the shape of objects but systematically incorrect beliefs about their location that will result in such successful sequences of team activity – I have tried, and failed. If someone claims there are many such potential mechanisms, the onus is on them to provide a list of examples to illustrate the point. I am unable.
Second, even if there are many such potential mechanisms, is there a significant probability, given N&E&C, that we have evolved such a mechanism rather than a reliable mechanism? Possibly not. Consider, again, a mechanism that is reliable about the shape of objects but systematically unreliable about their position. The most obvious way such a mechanism might evolve is in two stages: first evolving a mechanism that is reliable about both the shape and position of objects, and then engineering a mechanism that systematically reassigns positions to objects, but in such a way that, given the desires with which the species is also equipped, still results in adaptive behaviour. But why would that second level of engineering evolve given the reliable first level is already producing adaptive behaviour? What would be the pay off, for evolution, of now adding a sophisticated location-reassignment mechanism and changing the desires so that adaptive behaviour still results? If there is unlikely to be such a pay off, it is unlikely such a systematic-error-producing mechanism would evolve. Evolution will stick with the reliable mechanism.
In fact, even if N&E&C had equipped us with an unreliable perceptual faculty or faculties of type (2), it would still not follow that many of our beliefs are false. We have seen reasons to suppose that N&E&C will favour reliable as opposed to unreliable faculties of memory and procedural reasoning. If a species also possesses perceptual faculties that are partly reliable and partly, but systematically, unreliable, there arises the possibility that members of this species will be able to figure out that they are, to some extent, being systematically misled by those faculties. In which case, they may adjust their beliefs accordingly. Their beliefs would now reliably reflect reality, despite the fact that they possessed unreliable perceptual faculties. If R is the reliability of our cognitive faculties acting in tandem, the probability of R might still be high, even if it was more probable than not that we possess unreliable perceptual faculties of type (2).

Conclusion

Regarding his hypothetical creatures evolving on another planet, Plantinga claims that, for any given piece of adaptive behaviour,

there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false. Without further knowledge of these creatures, therefore, we could hardly estimate the probability of R on N&E and this final possibility [C] as high.

The word “therefore” in this passage is not justified. While it is true that there are many belief-cum-desire combinations that will lead to any given piece of adaptive action, it does not follow that we cannot reasonably estimate the probability of R/N&E&C to be high. This is because, when we turn from beliefs to belief-producing cognitive mechanisms of the sort with which we are actually equipped (e.g. reason, perception, memory), it is no longer clear that there are many (indeed, any) unreliable versions of such mechanisms that, by virtue of unguided evolution pairing them with certain hard-wired desires, will nevertheless result in sophisticated patterns of adaptive behaviour of the sort we actually exhibit.
Further, we have seen that, even if there are many such unreliable but adaptive versions of our cognitive faculties, (i) it doesn’t follow, on N&E&C, that such an unreliable version is at least as likely to have evolved as a reliable version (for it may be that, for the most likely candidates, the evolutionary route to the unreliable version is likely to be via the reliable version), and (ii) even if it is probable, on N&E&C, that we have evolved an unreliable version of such a mechanism (perception, say), it still does not follow that our cognitive mechanisms, acting in tandem, are unlikely to be reliable (for the errors introduced by the most likely candidate unreliable mechanisms may still be correctable).
So Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument fails. Indeed, I have sketched out some reasons for thinking that while, for any given piece of adaptive action, there are many belief-cum-desire combinations that will produce it, the probability, on N&E&C, that our cognitive faculties, operating in tandem, are reliable, is pretty high (though I certainly do not claim to have established that here).

Sunday, March 22, 2009

New York Law School Sports Law Panel this Wednesday

I'm honored to be speaking this Wednesday, March 25th, at New York Law School, on a sports panel. Here is info on the event:

* * *

The Media, Entertainment, and Sports Law Association at New York Law School will host a panel on sports law this Wednesday between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. in the Stiefel Reading Room.Topics will include sports contract negotiations and the legality of age limits in pro sports.

Distinguised panelists include:


Andre Buck
(NBA agent at Creative Artists Agency in New York City; has represented first round picks in the NBA Draft, including Aaron Brooks and Renaldo Blackman)

Marc Edelman
(Visiting Professor at Rutgers School of Law; founder of SportsJudge fantasy sports dispute resolution service)

Paul Haberman
(Associate at Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy & Bach in New York City; Chairman of the New York County Lawyers Association's Sports Law Committee)

Michael McCann
(Professor at Vermont Law School; Legal Analyst and SI.com columnist at Sports Illustrated; Former Chair of Association of American Law School's Section on Sports and the Law)

Alan Milstein
(Partner at Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose; has litigated on behalf of Maurice Clarett, Allen Iverson, Eddy Curry, jockey Eddie King, and other athletes; also a nationally-recognized expert on bioethics and clinical trials litigation)

Mark Stefanacci (Chief Operating Officer and Legal Counsel for the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority)

* * *

The event will be open to anyone with an invitation, which is free -- all you need to do is contact the event's organizer, Lauren Friedberg (the Society's Vice President of Sports) at lauren.friedberg[at]law.nyls.edu and let her know that you would like to attend. For directions to the law school, click here. It should be a great event and I hope to meet any Sports Law Blog readers who are in town and able to make it.

Saturday, March 21, 2009

Catching Up with Links

  • University of Illinois Law Professor John Colombo, who probably knows more about the intersection between tax and sports law than anyone, has posted a free draft of his forthcoming law review article: The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics. If you're interested in the NCAA's tax exempt status, be sure to check it out.
  • If you have HBO on Demand, be sure to check out the Real Sports feature on Brandon Jennings and his time in Itlay as he earns over $1 million playing basketball over there (instead of attending a U.S. college) while waiting to become eligible for the 2009 NBA Draft, where he's projected to be a top 15 pick. Sonny Vaccaro is interviewed by Bryant Gumbel and offers excellent analysis.
  • Nick Infante's College Athletics Clips is always worth checking out (subscription required). He has some engaging original pieces and some provocative guest pieces, including one by UNC Professor Richard Southall on the treatment of college athletes in the NCAA tournament.
  • Particularly for those of you have bought merchandise from the Coop in Harvard Square, you'll find the Associated Press's Jimmy Golen's recent piece of great interest. Jimmy examines how Harvard and some other schools are severing ties with Russell after two watchdog groups said the clothing-maker harassed pro-union Honduran employees.
  • If you are interested in sports law from the vantage point of a Connecticut attorney, Daniel Fitgerald, be sure to check out his blog, Connecticut Sports Law. Daniel has some terrifc posts up, including one on the United Football League not going to Hartford.
  • Dominic Parrelli of Sports Agent Blog has an engaging piece on players who have attendance clauses in their contracts. Ken Griffey Jr., for instance, can earn an additional $2.5 million if the Mariners' attendance reaches a certain level this season.
  • Several readers have asked if a video of the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference will be made available -- apparently a video is being prepared and it will feature some of the panels. In addition, HBO taped the panel that Sonny Vaccaro, Chris Wallace, Bob Scalise, Bob Ryan, and I were on, so there might be a separate source of footage for that one.

Justice Jackson on Umpiring and Judging

This post was written by John Q. Barrett of St. John's and the Robert H. Jackson Center; it was sent to the Jackson List and was forwarded by my FIU colleague, Tom Baker. Jackson's comments are in line with arguments I have made against Chief Justice Roberts's views of the judge-umpire connection.


On Thursday, December 13, 1951, Justice Robert H. Jackson spoke at the New York County Lawyers’ Association’s annual dinner, held at the Waldorf=Astoria Hotel in Manhattan. The Association and its 1,000 guests that evening honored senior federal Circuit Judges (and cousins) Learned Hand (age 79, and a judge since 1909) and Augustus Noble Hand (age 82 and a judge since 1914). To close the program, Justice Jackson delivered a “benediction” speech that included a now-famous line: “if I were to write a prescription for becoming the perfect district judge, it would be always to quote Learned and always to follow Gus.”

Justice Jackson also paid tribute to the Judges Hand that evening by drawing the analogy between an excellent judge and a baseball umpire. As Jackson put it,


the test of an independent judiciary is a simple one—the one you would apply in choosing an umpire for a baseball game. What do you ask of him? You do not ask that he shall never make a mistake or always agree with you, or always support the home team. You want an umpire who calls them as he sees them. And that is what the profession has admired in the Hands.



In recent years, the umpire-like work of judges has been described as much more mechanical than volitional. In 2005, then Circuit Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., nominated to serve as Chief Justice of the United States, testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that


[j]udges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.



Chief Justice Roberts was, of course, confirmed. In the process, his description of judging as mere rule-applying umpiring became a topic of much attention and discussion. Among lawyers, law professors and judges, the consensus view seems to be that the Chief Justice knows better, and that confirmation candidate advocacy should be recognized for what it is.

Interestingly, a captivating new book, New York Times reporter Bruce Weber’s As They See ‘Em: A Fan’s Travels in the Land of Umpires (Scribner) (click here), takes direct issue with the robotic, rule-enforcer view of umpires’ work. According to Mr. Weber,


[t]hough fans and broadcasters may treat the [home] plate umpire as if he were a mere ballot counter, punching the ticket of each pitch as it crosses the plate and acknowledging its ostensibly obvious credentials, in truth he’s much more of an arbitrator, keeping the most contested area on the ball field from being taken over by one side or the other.


Mr. Weber’s account of the umpireal job is not just his opinion. He quotes from major league umpires who explain their work as involving autonomy, responsibility and opportunities for judgment that resemble the work and responsibilities of, well, judges. The author explains that during two-plus years of attending umpire school and then interviewing almost 200 umpires and other baseball people,


[m]ore than one major league umpire spoke to me of calling balls and strikes as a kind of political enterprise, an activity requiring will and conscience and a point of view.



“It’s like the Constitution,” [current Major League Baseball umpire] Gary Cederstrom said to me. “The strike zone is a living, breathing document.”

When I asked [MLB umpire] Tim Tschida why balls and strikes provoked so many arguments and so much enmity, he responded by comparing the rulebook strike zone to one of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions of the twentieth century.

“Have you ever read Roe v. Wade?,” Tschida said. “It’s very clear. What it says is very clear. And we’ve still been fighting for twenty-five or thirty years over what it means.”



It seems, at least according to these umps, that Justice Jackson (who was, by the way, not a baseball fan) had it right about both their work and his own. Indeed, Jackson in his 1951 speech about “umpires” Learned and Augustus Hand seems to have been channeling some of the wisdom of one of that era’s, and humanity’s, greatest “judges”: an umpire’s qualities must include, said Branch Rickey, “the discretion of a judge….”

Troy Brooks's "Perfect Proof" of God

Here is an example (thanks to Mike J) of the kind of weird insanity that religion can instill (n.b. I am NOT saying all religious people are insane!). This chap has a proof of God's existence and is offering $10,000 to anyone who can refute it.

If you would like to make an attempt to disprove the proof for God, there is a forum where you can do so. $10,000 in U.S. dollars (getting cheaper by the day) has been reserved and offered to the first person who can disprove God's proof of Himself. Thousands have tried but failed. Since I am a child of God and thus, set before God with authority in His kingdom and bound for heaven, you can't ask for a better arbitrator. "Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven" (Matt. 18.18). The proof of God has been loosed on Earth so it is loosed in heaven: well approved! Lots of attempts have been made on the forums, and also, read here.


Yes that's right the arbitrator and judge, stamped with Divine authority and approval, of whether you succeed in refuting the proof is, er, Troy himself. Well, good luck then....

Thursday, March 19, 2009

First Draft of Plantinga Paper (part 1)

see new draft published 23rd March

Dawkins interviews Father George Coyne

Particularly illuminating interview, I thought. Go here.

Dan Dennett and Creationist videos

Couple of interesting videos here.

So why did New Scientist pull that article?

NEW HUMANIST ARTICLE: So why did New Scientist pull that article?

Now that some of the hysteria has died down over the removal from the New Scientist website of a piece on how to spot hidden religious agendas in science books, it's worth taking another look at the story. Article continues...

Shawn Hill Released by the Washington Nationals

Bill Ladson of MLB.com reported yesterday that the Nationals placed Shawn Hill “on waivers Wednesday for the purpose of giving him his unconditional release.” Ladson also reported that Hill will receive one-sixth of the $775,000 that he was awarded last month by an arbitration panel. Hill’s injury problems persisted into this spring, and he had only been able to pitch twice due to forearm tightness. Chico Harlan noted in his article for the Washington Post that the payment to Hill of just under $130,000 was exercised on Wednesday because of a deadline for the payment of a fractional amount. Both reporters stated that Hill took the news very hard.

Later in the day the Nationals signed Joe Beimel for $2,000,000. Beimel went to a hearing with the Los Angeles Dodgers in 2007. The arbitration panel of Stephen Goldberg, Elizabeth Neumeier, and John Sands sided with the Dodgers figure of $912,500. Beimel was asking for $1,250,000. Neumeier was also on the Hill panel this year along with Robert Bailey and Frederic Horowitz. Nationals manager Manny Acta expects to use Beimel as the set-up man in the eighth inning.

So, two pitchers who have both endured the hearing process have an interesting connection on the same day in March 2009. Beimel, who started his major league career as a starter with the Pittsburgh Pirates posted a 5-1 record last year in 71 games for the Dodgers. His 2.02 ERA was the best of his eight-year career. The Nationals will be his fifth team. Beimel also pitched for the Minnesota Twins (2004) and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays (2005). Beimel became a free agent for the first time at the end of 2008 season. His contract with the Nationals is a little under the amount he earned last year with the incentives that he met according to an article by Tony Jackson on the Los Angeles Daily News inside the dodgers blog.

Thoughts for the Big Dance: On Duke Hatred

Good piece from The New Republic on the venomous hatred of Duke basketball and Duke players and the way that hatred is explicitly and unabashedly expressed in homophobic terms.

This really is part of the larger issue of race in college basketball (which the article touches on briefly) and the perception that white players are "soft" spot-up shooters, rather than "tough, strong athletes." In the macho context of sports, such traits translate into homosexuality. The phenomenon actually is not limited to Duke. But it finds it most frequent target there because Duke produces more highly publicized and/or star players (where Duke is concerned, the categories may be very different) who are white.

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

FSU College of Law Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Society 6th Annual Conference

I look forward to speaking at the Florida State University College of Law Entertainment, Arts, & Sports Law Society's (EASL) 6th Annual Conference this Saturday, March 21, 2009. The conference will commence at 12:00 p.m. [note change from 11:00 a.m.] in the Florida State College of Law Rotunda in Tallahassee. It will consist of discussions comprised of entertainment, sports, and arts lawyers, managers, record label owners, and industry professionals.

Joining me as a speaker will be:
  • Christopher Griffin (partner at Foley & Lardner whose practice has focused on representing clients in business and broadcasting transactions involving college football, bowl games, and NCAA regulatory issues. He is a member of the NCAA Division I Infractions Committee and is a past president of the National Football Foundation's Tampa Chapter).
  • Sandra Brown (partner at Sandra Brown, Esq in Atlanta and whose practice has focused on business counsel for entertainers, including musicians in their contractual relations with record labels; former Associate Director of Business Affairs of the record label owned by music producer Jermaine Dupri, So So Def Recordings, Inc.)
  • Oswaldo Rossi (director of Legal and Business Affairs for EMI Music Latin America, his practice has focused on negotiating recorded deals and license agreements. His work also includes oversight of releases, including by such EMI musicians as Vico C and D.J. Tony Touch).
The event is open to the public. If you are interested in attending, please contact Shane Costello, the President of the Entertainment, Arts, Sports Law Society, at stc06[at]fsu.edu. Please let me know as well, as it would be great to meet a reader of this blog.

Topps Trading Cards Go Online

3 1/2 weeks ago, I participated in an ABA teleconference and explained why the Eighth Circuit's decision in the CBC case was incorrectly decided. At one point, I discussed how the development of new technologies does not, and should not, change the right of publicity/First Amendment analysis, e.g. the fact that fantasy leagues are now being sold online as opposed to in a box off the store shelf (see Uhlaender case). In that regard, I mentioned that online trading cards, if there ever is such a thing, would not change the fact that the players have a right of publicity in trading card use (see Haelan Labs. case).

Yesterday, Laurie Sullivan of Online Media Daily reported that The Topps Co. has just announced a series of online baseball trading cards whereby the players come to life through a standard Web camera and technology. Consumers have an option to pull the "magic" card from the deck and play a game online by signing onto ToppsTown.com with a code and downloading a browser plug in, which then allows them to pitch, bat or catch in games served up from the website.

This new development by Topps really demonstrates why the Eighth Circuit's decision in the CBC case is flawed. The district court merely noted the factual distinction between trading cards and fantasy leagues in that trading cards contain likenesses. However, the court provided no explanation whatsoever as to why there should be a legal distinction, and the reason why it didn't is fairly simple: Because there is none. Moreover, the fact that Topps is now online and has created a game with the use of trading cards (akin to fantasy leagues) does not magicly transform trading cards into a First Amendment protected use.

MP3 of Little Atoms interview

There is an mp3 of this 30 min interview available here. I talk about CFI, religion, skepticism, creationism, etc.

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

Pope says condoms not the answer in fight against AIDS

For the story go here and here.

Pope Benedict XVI has said that handing out condoms is not the answer in the fight against HIV/Aids, as he makes his first visit to Africa as pontiff.

Speaking en route to Cameroon, he said distribution of condoms "increases the problem".

I previously posted on this topic here.

Perhaps this is one area where we can say, more or less without qualification, that religion is dangerous.

New Scientist article pulled due to legal threat

The New Scientist article how to spot a religious agenda (which we recently discussed) has been self-censored because of a legal threat.

Any one know any more details?

Full text still available here.

Wiki info here.

PZ Myers comments here.

More comment here.

PUBLIC DEBATE: The God Delusion - Monday 6th April


Marianne Talbot (Brasenose College, Oxford) and Stephen Law (CFI Provost) discuss Dawkins’s book with the audience. Held at the Department of Continuing Education, University of Oxford.

Monday, 6th April

7-10pm (bar till 11pm)

THIS EVENT IS FREE.

Address: Lecture Theatre, Rewley House, 1 Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JA.

Saturday, March 14, 2009

Pardon Pervez Kambakhsh

I am sure most of you know about the case of the young student journalist Sayed Pervez Kambaksh, sentenced to death by courts in Afghanistan for distributing literature supporting women's rights (which amounts to "blasphemy"). The sentence was reduced to 20 years.

The Independent is fighting Pevez's corner.

There is a facebook group to join here.

Will the President of Afghanistan issue a pardon?

Friday, March 13, 2009

The dingers


Thought I would get something off my chest. I hate dingers. You know, the people who park up alongside your car, then carelessly open their door into yours, leaving a little ding or dent.

Most people aren't dingers. I have never put a ding in a car. I hook my finger round the door so as not to do any damage.

But look at any car more than a year old, and chances it it will have numerous little dings in its panels.

Who are the dingers? And how do we make them stop!

Do they not know they are dinging? Or do they not really care?

Now someone close to me who shall remain nameless is, in fact, a dinger. It drives me nuts. I once parked up alongside a brand new £35,000 Audi. Predicting the inevitable, I said "Open your door carefully - that's a brand new..." Ding! And the owners were still in it. Reply: "What's the big deal? It's just a car."

Is this a petty and shallow obsession of mine? Should I just get a life? Or is this a TOTAL FRIGGING MENACE?! If so, what do we do about it? Yes, I shall be purchasing a rubber door thingy for our car - but what about others?

Thursday, March 12, 2009

Nova Southeastern University Symposium

On Saturday, March 28, the Sports & Entertainment Law Society at the NSU Shepard Broad Law Center (co-sponsored by the Florida Bar Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section) is hosting a symposium entitled, Adaptation: “Staying ahead of legal issues arising in the new digital age”. I will be on a panel explaining why athletes have a right of publicity when huge corporate conglomerates profit from the use of their names in the sale of commercial fantasy league products. Don Fehr is the keynote speaker for the event. The schedule of events and registration information are at the above link.

Vancouver?

I am strongly considering blowing my literary prize money on month long trip with family to Vancouver this August. But is there enough there to keep a 4 year old and 10 year old happy? Any advice appreciated...

I have a possible house swap in the pipeline.

Resonance FM radio show

I will be on London's Resonance FM "Little Atoms" radio show 7pm tomorrow (Friday) night. Talking about CFI, scepticism, religion, etc.

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

Philosopher Roger Scruton lambasts the new humanists

Here. From American Spectator. Scruton laments the passing of his parents' style of humanism, and attacks the "new humanism" of Dawkins and the BHA.

"Like so many modern ideologies, the new humanism seeks to define itself through what it is against rather than what it is for. It is for nothing, or at any rate for nothing in particular."

The new humanism "seems to have no consciousness of what is clearly announced between the lines of the text [ON THE ATHEIST BUSES], namely that there are no ideals higher than pleasure."

The BHA's "publications imply that there is only one thing that stands between man and his happiness, and that is the belief in God. "


Bit of "straw man" going on here? I know many humanists but I am not sure I know of any that believe (i) "there are no ideals higher than pleasure" and (ii) "only one thing stands between man and his happiness, and that is the belief in God". I don't believe either.

Surely the message "clearly announced" by the bus posters is not that there is "no higher ideal than pleasure", but rather: "Don't allow, as so many do, belief in God and his divine plan to blight your life (through endless recriminations about your sexuality, about a "woman's role", etc.). Contrary to what most religions tell you, this is the only life you have - so make the most of it!"

Scruton is, of course, a gifted philosopher well-versed in the careful reading of texts and weighing of evidence. It's odd he should be so sloppy here. I'd ask him: (a) where is his evidence that BHA texts commonly "imply" (ii), and (b) does he really believe the atheist bus posters "clearly announce" that there is "no ideal higher than pleasure"?

I guess one moral we should extract from this piece is - we humanists need to to be extremely careful how we phrase things. If there's the even slightest chance a comment could be interpreted as promoting unbridled hedonism, etc., you can be sure that's exactly how it will be interpreted!

But is there some truth to the suggestion that new humanists are not "for" anything in particular?

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Breaking Down Helio Castroneves Tax Evasion Case

I have a new column on SI.com -- it is on the government's tax evasion case against Penske Racing's Helio Castroneves, who won the Indianapolis 500 in 2001 and 2002 and Dancing with the Stars in 2007 with dancer/country music singer Julianne Hough. Here is an excerpt:

* * *

The key for Castroneves, however, is whether the government can prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Castroneves had any material role in Seven Promotions. [Roy] Black -- Castroneves' lead counsel -- argues that Castroneves did not organize the corporation, possess its shares, or serve as an officer. Instead, according to Black, Helio Castroneves, Sr. owned and operated Seven Promotions, without any role played by his son or daughter. The cloaked nature of the bearer share corporation may advance Black's case.

More generally, Black maintains that Castroneves -- focused on his career rather than his money -- lacked awareness as to his finances and did not appreciate far-away business dealings in Panama and the Netherlands. Black also claims that even when presented with opportunities to learn about his finances, Castroneves apparently lacked the interest and capacity to understand them. As a result, Castroneves signed papers without understanding their meaning.

Bolstering this defense is that other drivers, including Eliot Sadler of Sprint Cup, have complained about convoluted verbiage found in racing contracts. Keep in mind, if the jury concludes that Castroneves lacked financial understanding, he would be poised to escape conviction: tax evasion requires the prosecution to prove that Castroneves willfully evaded taxes; if he was unaware that certain payments must be treated as taxable income, then he could not have committed tax evasion.

Based on data, however, the chance of Castroneves succeeding is slim. Prosecutors obtain convictions in over 90 percent of tax evasion cases, with some estimates claiming a prosecutorial success rate as high as 97 percent.

* * *

To read the rest of the column, click here.

Baggini on Hume (V)

Julian's fifth installment is out, I see, but still no defence of his initial claim that:

The most pressing and telling critiques of religion not only cannot, but should not, attempt to deliver any fatal blows...

A Sceptical Inquiry


From Richard Dawkins to the atheist bus, critical thinking has made an unexpected return to popularity. Chris French, editor of the Skeptic magazine, wonders why - here.

GOD IN THE LAB - SAT 21ST MARCH


Description: A day with some of the world’s leading scientific researchers into faith, many from Oxford University.

£10 or £5 students.

We’ll be looking at hearing voices, possession, etc. What goes on the brain of someone hearing voices? Come and see the MRI scans. Is religious belief hard-wired into us? Yes, says one speaker, and provides the empirical evidence.

One of our scientists was recently featured in NEW SCIENTIST magazine. A unique opportunity to hear and question those working at the cutting edge of this growing field of scientific research.

Organized by Stephen Law, CFI UK Provost.

Location: Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4RL (close to Holborn tube).

To book, send a cheque payable to “Centre for Inquiry London” to: Executive Director Suresh Lalvani, Centre for Inquiry London, at the above address (Include names of all those coming). Alternatively use the “Support CFI UK” button at www.cfiuk.org and follow the instructions (credit and debit cards). £10 or £5 students.

Start Time: 10:30 (for 11am). End Time: 16:00

Monday, March 9, 2009

Um work...

Apologies for infrequent posts - tied up with work. Normal service resumes shortly....